

What is iO and its application

introduction to indistinguishability obfuscation



Pia Park

Research Engineer (grantee)

Machina iO, PSE'EF

Trust-less Applications

- **Bitcoin and Ethereum Bridge**
- **Encrypted mempools**
- **Private Voting**
- **Private Auctions**
- **zk-TLS**

Trust-less Applications **Really?**

- Bitcoin and Ethereum Bridge
 - Encrypted mempools
 - Private Voting
 - Private Auctions
 - zk-TLS
- **Threshold-based cryptography**
 - **multi party computation**
 - **multi-key FHE**



Trust-less Applications **Really!**

- Bitcoin and Ethereum Bridge
- Encrypted mempools
- Private Voting
- Private Auctions
- zk-TLS
- **indistinguishability obfuscation**



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- 2. What is iO**
- 3. Application of iO**
- 4. Our contributions and progress**

Bitcoin and Ethereum Bridge




signature




key

Multi-Party Computation




threshold


Limitation of **Multi-Party** Computation




Limitation of **Multi-Party** Computation



Limitation of **Multi-Party** Computation




Obfuscation fixes this



What is Obfuscation?

Obfuscation as a program compiler



What is Obfuscation?

Obfuscation as a program compiler



Useful mental model of Obfuscation

$$\text{Obf}(f(k, \cdot)) \rightarrow \widetilde{C}$$

obfuscation

$$\text{Eval}(\widetilde{C}, x) \rightarrow f(k, x)$$

evaluation

Useful mental model of Obfuscation

- non interactive
- f and $\text{Obf}(C)$ is public
- k is private
- binded to f

$$\text{Obf}(f(k, \cdot)) \rightarrow \widetilde{C}$$

$$\text{Eval}(\widetilde{C}, x) \rightarrow f(k, x)$$

obfuscation

evaluation

Useful mental model of Obfuscation

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$$\text{Eval}(\widetilde{C}, x) \rightarrow f(k, x)$$

e.g. Bitcoin and Ethereum Bridge

$$f(k, x) =$$


if given proof(=x) of burning
WBTC on ethereum is valid
→ I want to get a signature to
withdraw bitcoins from
hardcoded wallet secret key (=k)

Useful mental model of Obfuscation

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$$\text{Eval}(\widetilde{C}, x) \rightarrow f(k, x)$$

e.g. Bitcoin and Ethereum Bridge


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Applications of Obfuscation

You want to encode **specific secret** within a **specific program** and allow others to use it

- **Private non-interactive computation**
 - **Secrets are hardcoded in the programs then obfuscated**
 - **Anyone can execute the program and learn nothing about secret**

Trust-less Applications **Really!**

- Bitcoin and Ethereum Bridge
- Encrypted mempools
- Private Voting
- Private Auctions
- zk-TLS
- **indistinguishability obfuscation**



Possible futures of the Ethereum protocol, part 6: The Splurge

2024 Oct 29

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manufacture, and are so powerful that they are not allowed in duels. Similarly, in cryptography, we have the trio of Egyptian god protocols:

ZK-SNARK

FHE

OBFUSCATION



Our contributions and progress

README.md



Machina iO

Machina iO ("mah-kin-ah") a project within [PSE](#), aims to move iO from theory to practice. We publish papers and write code.

Sora Suegami
Enrico Bottazzi
Pia Park

Our contributions and progress

✓ Straightforward iO construction

Diamond iO: A Straightforward Construction of Indistinguishability Obfuscation from Lattices

Sora Suegami*, Enrico Bottazzi†

February 2025

Abstract

Indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) has seen remarkable theoretical progress, yet it remains impractical due to its high complexity and inefficiency. A common bottleneck in recent iO schemes is the reliance on bootstrapping techniques from functional encryption (FE) into iO, which requires recursively invoking the FE encryption algorithm for each input bit—creating a significant barrier to practical iO schemes.

In this work, we propose diamond iO, a new lattice-based iO construction that replaces the costly recursive encryption process with lightweight matrix operations. Our construction is proven secure under the learning with errors (LWE) and evasive LWE assumptions, as well as our new assumption—all-product LWE—in the pseudorandom oracle model. By leveraging the FE scheme for pseudorandom functionalities introduced by Agrawal et al. (ePrint'24) in a non-black-box manner, we remove the reliance on prior FE-to-iO bootstrapping techniques and thereby significantly reduce complexity. A remaining challenge is to reduce our new assumption to standard assumptions such as LWE, further advancing the goal of a practical and sound iO construction.

Our contributions and progress

✓ **Straightforward iO construction**

✓ **End to End implementation of Diamond iO with secure param**

The screenshot shows the GitHub repository page for 'diamond-io'. The repository is public and has 35 branches and 0 tags. It has 4 forks and 35 stars. The commit history is as follows:

Commit	Message	Time
rkdud007	fix: real param format	2 days ago
	feat: memory based matrix, mmap as optional (#79)	3 days ago
	feat: memory based matrix, mmap as optional (#79)	3 days ago
	Fix warnings	last month
	Exp/larger base (#76)	last week
	Feat: optimize ip circuit (#84)	3 days ago
	fix: real param format	2 days ago
	Feat/store preimages to disk (#56)	3 weeks ago
	Update a simulator of parameters (#31)	last month
	feat: add memory_profile (#52)	3 weeks ago
	feat: memory based matrix, mmap as optional (#79)	3 days ago
	license	last month
	feat: memory based matrix, mmap as optional (#79)	3 days ago
	chore: polish	2 months ago
	perf: circuit evaluation with dfs + chore: rm parallel featur...	2 weeks ago
	Feat: optimize ip circuit (#84)	3 days ago
	feat: memory based matrix, mmap as optional (#79)	3 days ago

The repository details on the right include:

- About:** Diamond iO implementation, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/236>
- Releases:** No releases published, [Create a new release](#)
- Packages:** No packages published, [Publish your first package](#)
- Contributors:** 3 contributors: rkdud007, enricobottazzi, SoraSuegami

Our contributions and progress

✓ **Straightforward iO construction**

Existing simulated result (BOK+15, ESSoS):

✓ **End to End implementation of Diamond iO with secure param**

More than 10^{27} years
for obfuscation and evaluation

VS

Our sufficiently secure parameters
(target security parameter 80, 1 input bit,
around 60 gates):

Less than one hour
for obfuscation and evaluation
(we are double checking this result)

Our contributions and progress

✓ **Straightforward iO construction**

✓ **End to End implementation of Diamond iO with secure param**

🏗️ **Let's make iO practical!**

A. Larger input size

B. Complex circuit logic and depth

Existing simulated result (BOK+15, ESSoS):

More than 10^{27} years

for obfuscation and evaluation

VS

Our sufficiently secure parameters (target security parameter 80, 1 input bit, around 60 gates):

Less than one hour

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
(we are double checking this result)

Q & A

Appendix

Indistinguishability Obfuscation (iO)

Obfuscations of two circuits with the same functionality, i.e., input-output relation, are **indistinguishable**.



$$C_0(x) = C_1(x)$$

Bootstrapping from FHE+ZKP to iO

Obfuscate: P_1 generates an obfuscated program $\tilde{C} \leftarrow \text{Obf}(f(k, \cdot))$. f and \tilde{C} is public, k is secret.


- Internally P_1 generate a ciphertext $\text{Enc}(k)$ for secret k

Evaluate: P_2 runs \tilde{C} over their input x to obtain $f(k, x)$.

- Internally P_2 dynamically choose an input x and homomorphically evaluate f over x and $\text{Enc}(k)$ to obtain a new ciphertext $\text{Enc}(f(k, x))$
- P_2 decrypt $\text{Enc}(f(k, x))$ and obtain $f(k, x)$ but not learning about k

Comparison with FHE

1. FHE is **malleable**: FHE itself cannot restrict a function being evaluated on given ciphertexts. A zk proof of homomorphic evaluation result is necessary to confirm the validity of the output encryption.
2. FHE requires **interaction**: An party holding a private key needs to remain online until receiving the output encryption and the proof.



Difference with FHE

HE (homomorphic encryption)

What's different from FHE: if this evaluate, homomorphic operation can be perform over arbitrary addition and multiplication, we consider FHE (fully homomorphic encryption)

What's different from FE: if you hold sk , can able to decrypt x as well. If encryptor (P_2) want to hide x from decryptor (P_1), you'd need functional encryption

- **Setup (KeyGen):** P_1 setup key $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ and pk is public, sk is secret
- **Encrypt:** P_2 encrypt over public key pk and plain text x . $ct \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk, x)$
- **Evaluate:** P_2 evaluate (homomorphic operation) over public key pk .
 $ct' \leftarrow \text{Eval}(pk, C, ct)$
- **Decrypt:** P_1 can decrypt using secret key $f(x) \leftarrow \text{Dec}(sk, ct')$.



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